We give a rigorous deterministic polynomial time algorithm for the modular inversion hidden number problem introduced by D. Boneh, S. Halevi and N. A. Howgrave-Graham in 2001. For our algorithm we need to be given about 2/3 of the bits of the output, which matches one of the heuristic algorithms of D. Boneh, S. Halevi and N. A. Howgrave-Graham and answers one of their open questions. However their more efficient algorithm that requires only 1/3 of the bits of the output still remains heuristic.
Introduction

Motivation
Since Boneh and Venkatesan [6, 7] introduced the hidden number problem in 1996, it has been generalised in a number of directions and has found a wide spectrum of applications in cryptography and beyond, see [16] for a survey of relevent results and also [1] for some recent developments and a new approach. Here we consider a modification of the original problem which has been introduced by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham [5] .
More precisely, for a prime p, denote by IF p the field of p elements and always assume that it is represented by the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Accordingly, sometimes, where obvious, we treat elements of IF p as integer numbers in the above range.
For integers x and m ≥ 1 we denote by x m the remainder of x on division by m. Given an integer m and > 0, we denote by MSB ,m (x) any integer u such that
Roughly speaking, MSB ,m (x) gives most significant bits of the remainder of x modulo m. However, this definition is more flexible and suits better our purposes. In particular we remark that in the above inequality need not be an integer.
Following Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham [5] we consider the following Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem, ModInv-HNP:
Recover a number α ∈ IF p such that for N elements t 1 , . . . , t N ∈ IF p \ {−α}, chosen independently and uniformly at random, we are given N pairs
for some > 0. Besides being of independent interest and giving an interesting example of yet another natural problem of this type, see [16] for a survey, it has also been mentioned in [5] as a building block for constructing efficient pseudorandom number generators and message authentication codes. Motivated by these applications, here we modify and rigorously analyze the algorithm outlined in [5, Section 3.1], using some ideas from [2] [3] [4] . We note that our algorithm works only if for some fixed ε > 0 we have > (2/3 + ε)k for a sufficiently large k-bit prime p. In [5] one can find another algorithm together with a heuristic argument that it works already for > (1/3+ε)k, however it seems quite difficult to give a rigorous analysis of this algorithm, which can be a serious drawback in various cryptographic applications of ModInv-HNP (see [5] for some possible applications).
Throughout the paper we use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z.
Lattices and SVP problem
We recall that a lattice L is a set of all integer linear combinations of the form
for r linearly independent real vectors b 1 , . . . , b r in the s dimensional Euclidean space IR s (note that r ≤ s). The set {b 1 , . . . , b r } is said to be a basis of L.
One of the most fundamental problems in this area is the γ-shortest vector problem, γ-SVP: given a real γ ≥ 1 and a basis of a lattice L in IR s , find a nonzero vector u ∈ L, with the Euclidean norm u no more than γ times larger than the Euclidean norm of the shortest nonzero vector in L, that is,
For γ = 1 this problem is known as simply SVP, we refer to [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] for the state of art and also surveys of previous results concerning different algorithms for γ-SVP.
Main results
We assume that we have access to a γ-SVP algorithm.
Theorem 1. Assume that for a prime number p we are given n + 1 pairs
chosen uniformly at random. Then α ∈ IF p can be recovered in deterministic polynomial time and a single call to a γ-SVP algorithm on a (2n + 2)-dimensional lattice with polynomially bounded basis, except with probability
over the choices of t 1 , . . . , t n+1 , when it either returns no answer or returns a wrong answer, where h = γ √ 2n + 2 and ∆ = p/2 +1 .
Theorem 1 implies that for almost all evaluation points, ModInv-HNP can be solved in deterministic polynomial time if > (2/3 + ε)k where k is the bit length of p (for any constant ε > 0). The following corollary gives a more precise statement, in two variants, using two different SVP approximation algorithms. Although the run-time is polynomial in k for any constant ε in both cases, the dependance on ε is different, and allows trading off a larger run-time for a smaller minimum allowed value of k. Corollary 1. Fix ε and δ with 0 < δ < ε < 1. Let
let p be a k-bit prime and let > (2/3 + ε)k. There exist deterministic algorithms A 1 and A 2 such that given n 0 + 1 pairs
chosen uniformly at random, for k ≥ k ν the algorithm A ν runs in time T ν , ν = 1, 2, and recovers α ∈ IF p correctly with probability at least 1−p −δ over the choices of t 1 , . . . , t n0+1 , where
for some absolute effectively computable constants c 1 and c 2 , and
Proof. Plugging ∆ = 2 k− +O(1) and p = 2 k+O(1) in the first term of the error probability bound in Theorem 1, and using that > (2/3 + ε)k we see that
.
Now a straightforward computation shows that the first term is upper bounded by
for a sufficiently large absolute constant C 1 , and using that δ < ε, we see that n ≥ n 0 implies (1). Furthermore, another straightforward computation shows that the second term in the error probability of Theorem 1 is bounded by
(for a suitable absolute constant C 2 ). It is easy to see that this condition on k is implied by (1) , provided that C 0 is large enough, using δ < ε.
For A 1 , we apply the 1-SVP algorithm of [11] to a lattice of dimension s = 2n 0 + 2, which gives h = √ 2n 0 + 2. For A 2 , we use the 2 O(s(log log s) 2 / log s) -SVP algorithm of Schnorr [15] for s = 2n 0 + 2, which gives h = 2 n0+1 √ 2n 0 + 2. Recalling the definition of n 0 , the stated bounds on k follow.
This completes the proof.
Note that a trivial information theoretic lower bound on the number n 0 + 1 of pairs
since α has entropy at least k−1 bits, and each pair provides at most bits of information on α. Hence for the parameter choice > (2/3 + ε)k, our algorithm works with n 0 within a constant factor of the lower bound, with a constant that varies inversely with ε.
Proof of Theorem 1
Algorithm
We assume that 2h∆ ≤ 6h∆ 2 < p (3) since otherwise the result is trivial (as the claimed bound on the probability exceeds 1).
Assume we are given n + 1 pairs of integers (t i , u i ) with
for some integers e i with |e i | ≤ ∆, i = 1, . . . , n + 1.
Rewriting these congruences as
and eliminating α, we obtain
for i = 2, . . . , n + 1. Denoting
we write (5) as
We now rescale the coefficients as
for i = 2, . . . , n + 1, and notice that the vector e = ∆ 2 , ∆e 1 , . . . , ∆e n+1 , e 1 e 2 , . . . , e 1 e n+1 belongs to the lattice L consisting of solutions
of the congruences
. . . , n + 1.
x 0 ≡ 0 (mod ∆ 2 ), x j ≡ 0 (mod ∆), j = 1, . . . , n + 1.
We note that a (2n + 2) × (2n + 2) integral basis matrix
whose rows generate L can be constructed efficiently as follows:
The first two columns are defined as follows: M 0,0 = ∆ 2 and M i,0 = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 2n + 1 (imposing the relation x 0 ≡ 0 (mod ∆ 2 )), and M 1,1 = ∆ and M i,1 = 0 for j = 1 (relation x 1 ≡ 0 (mod ∆)).
For j ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}, there are two possible cases: • If C j ≡ 0 (mod p), then C j is invertible modulo p, and we set M j,j = ∆ and M i,j = 0 for i = j (we recall the relation x j ≡ 0 (mod ∆)) and M 0,
• If C j ≡ 0 (mod p), then the relations x j ≡ 0 (mod ∆) and x j ≡ −a j x 0 − b 1,j x 1 (mod p) hold. Since p and ∆ are coprime, the latter two congruences are equivalent to the single congruence
, and M n+j,n+j = 1 and M i,n+j = 0 for i = n + j (we recall the relation x 1,n+j ∈ Z Z). Clearly the Euclidean norm e of e satisfies the inequality
We run the γ-SVP algorithm on the lattice L. Let
where f 0 , . . . , f n+1 , f 1,2 , . . . , f 1,n+1 ∈ Z Z, be the returned approximation to the shortest nonzero vector in L. So
We have
We now consider the vector
. . . , n + 1, and d 1,i = f 0 e 1 e i − f 1,i i = 2, . . . , n + 1. Observe that if d i = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} and also f 0 = 0, then we can compute e i = f i /f 0 . To decide which of the integral ratios f i /f 0 is indeed equal to e i , we perform the following "consistency check":
• We form the set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n + 1} of i = 1, . . . , n + 1 with integral values of f i /f 0 and u i ≡ f i /f 0 (mod p). For every i ∈ I we compute
and also define h ij , j = 1, . . . , n + 1, by the conditions
(again discarding the values of i for which at least one inversion fails). • We now choose the smallest i 0 ∈ I for which for all j = 1, . . . , n + 1, the values h i0j exist and satisfy |h i0j | ≤ ∆, and return β i0 . Otherwise we return failure.
Necessary conditions for failure
Let us define the quantities
Let us define the "bad" events E 1 : d i = 0 or E i = 0, for every i = 2, . . . , n + 1, E 2 : f 0 = 0 and E 1 does not hold, E 3 : α = β i0 and E 1 and E 2 do not hold.
Note that we ignore the case of d 1 = 0 as below we shown in Section 2.4 that E 2 impllies d 1 = 0. As observed above, our algorithm succeeds (that is, β i0 = α) if E 1 , E 2 and E 3 do not occur.
We now upper bound the probability of these bad events over the choice of t 1 , . . . , t n+1 , chosen uniformly at random from IF p \ {−α}.
We first derive some useful relations satisfied by the difference vector d. Using the first n congruences in (6), we find that
Note that for i = 1, . . . , n + 1 we have
and also for i = 2, . . . , n + 1,
We see that (9) implies
Recalling the definition of
Finally, using (4) we derive a quadratic congruence in t i :
where
and E i is given by (8) , i = 2, . . . , n + 1.
Estimating the probability of E 1
Assume that E 1 holds. Let us fix some values of t 1 , d i for i = 1, . . . , n + 1, and d 1,i for i = 2, . . . , n + 1. We now consider, the number of n-tuples (t 2 , . . . , t n+1 ) ∈ (IF p \ {−α}) n satisfying (13) .
We claim that for every i = 2, . . . , n + 1, the left hand side of (13) is a non-constant polynomial of degree at most 2 in t i and hence has at most 2 solutions for t i . Thus we have at most 2 n such n-tuples.
Indeed, by our assumption, we know that either d i = 0 or E i = 0 holds. In the case d i = 0, using the inequality |d i | ≤ 2h · ∆ < p, see (3), we have d i ≡ 0 (mod p). There are two subcases to consider:
• If E i ≡ 0 (mod p), then (14) shows that U i ≡ 0 (mod p).
• If E i ≡ 0 (mod p) then U i ≡ 0 (mod p) if and only if we have α + t 1 ≡ d i /E i (mod p), which implies that V i ≡ d i (mod p) and hence V i ≡ 0 (mod p). So the claim holds if d i = 0.
In the case d i = 0 and E i = 0, from (11) we have that |E i | ≤ 6h∆ 2 < p, so, recalling (3), we see that E i ≡ 0 (mod p), and then (14) shows that U i ≡ 0 (mod p), as claimed. Now, we see from (10) that the tuple (d 1 , . . . , d n+1 ) can take at most (4h∆ + 1) n+1 possible values. Furthermore, using the inequality |E i | ≤ 6h∆ 2 , we also see that the tuple (E 2 , . . . , E n+1 ) takes at most (12h∆ 2 + 1) n possible values. Since t 1 can take p − 1 possible values and (t 2 , . . . , t n+1 ) at most 2 n possible values, we conclude that there are at most
tuples (t 1 , . . . , t n+1 ) for which the bad event E 1 happens. So the probability of E 1 is at most
Estimating the probability of E 2
We first claim that E 2 implies d 1 = 0. Indeed, ¬E 1 means that there exists j ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1} such that d j = 0 and E j = 0. Then from (14) , we see that U j = V j = 0 and W j = −(α + t 1 ) · d 1 . Hence (13) implies that W j ≡ 0 (mod p), which leads to d 1 ≡ 0 mod p (since α + t 1 ≡ 0 (mod p)) and hence d 1 = 0 (since |d 1 | < 2h∆ < p).
Now, let us consider the set S = {i ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1} : E i = 0 and d i = 0}, and denote its size by k. We claim that k < n. Indeed, from (8), we see that for each i ∈ S we have E i = d 1,i . Therefore, if k = n then we have d i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n + 1 and d 1,i = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n + 1, which implies (since f 0 = 0) that f = 0, a contradiction. Thus we must have k < n. Now, let us fix t 1 , d i for i = 2, . . . , n + 1, and d 1,i for i = 2, . . . , n + 1 and consider, for i = 2, . . . , n + 1 the number of solutions for t i satisfying (13) . If i ∈ S, then the left hand side of (13) is the zero polynomial so t i has p possible values. If i ∈ S, we have d i = 0 or E i = 0 so (as shown in the analysis of E 1 above) the left hand side of (13) is a non-constant polynomial of degree at most 2 and hence there are at most 2 possible values for t i . Overall there are at most 2 n−k (p − 1) k solutions for (t 2 , . . . , t n+1 ). There are p − 1 possible values for t 1 . Furthermore, as before we see that there are at most (12h∆ 2 + 1) n−k possible values for E i and (4h∆ + 1) n−k possible values for d i with i ∈ S. So overall, there are at most
tuples (t 1 , . . . , t n+1 ) for which the bad event E 2 happens. So, since k < n, the probability of E 2 is at most
We see that
Indeed, for 2(4h∆+1) 3 /(p−1) ≥ 1/2 it is obvious as we always have Pr[E 2 ] ≤ 1; otherwise it follows from (16).
Estimating the probability of E 3
If E 3 holds, then we have that β i0 and α = β i0 satisfy the relations
for j = 1, . . . , n+1. Subtracting the last two relations and multiplying by (α+t j )·(β i0 +t j ) we obtain the relation
with |h i0j | ≤ ∆, j = 1, . . . , n + 1. Clearly for every fixed β i0 and h i0j there are at most two possible values of t j . Since there are p − 1 possibilities of β i0 and at most 2∆ + 1 possibilities for every h i0j , j = 1, . . . , n + 1, as before we conclude that
which together with (15) and (17) concludes the proof.
Remarks
We note that a slightly more careful analysis of the event E 2 in the proof of Theorem 1 allows to show that k = n − 1 with probability O(∆ 2 /p) which improves the second term in the probability estimate of Theorem 1. This however does not change the 2/3threshold in Corollary 1. It remains a challenging open problem to get a rigorous version of the other (presumably more powerful) algorithm of [5] (or its appropriate modification) which can potentially lead to the replacing 2/3 with 1/3. This algorithm is based on the ideas of Coppersmith [8, 9] . However the rigorous analysis of this approach seems to be much more difficult which we pose an open question.
It is also interesting to check whether the recently emerged approach of Akavia [1] can be applied to ModInv-HNP.
More generally, it is certainly interesting to study a general problem of recovering of an unknown rational function ψ(X) ∈ IF p (X) from a sequence of k pairs (t i , MSB ,p (ψ(t i ))), i = 1, . . . , k.
Finally, it appears that ModInv-HNP in the case when the modulus p is also hidden is a much more difficult problem to which no feasible approaches are known at the moment. Thus this could be a very promising cryptographic primitive.
